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Abstract The ‘‘science commons,’’ knowledge that is widely accessible at low or no
cost, is a uniquely important input to scientific advance and cumulative technological
innovation. It is primarily, although not exclusively, funded by government and
nonprofit sources. Much of it is produced at academic research centers, although
some academic science is proprietary and some privately funded R&D enters the
science commons. Science in general aspires to Mertonian norms of openness,
universality, objectivity, and critical inquiry. The science commons diverges from
proprietary science primarily in being open and being very broadly available. These
features make the science commons particularly valuable for advancing knowledge,
for training innovators who will ultimately work in both public and private sectors,
and in providing a common stock of knowledge upon which all players—both public
and private—can draw readily. Open science plays two important roles that pro-
prietary R&D cannot: it enables practical benefits even in the absence of profitable
markets for goods and services, and its lays a shared foundation for subsequent
private R&D. The history of genomics in the period 1992–2004, covering two periods
when genomic startup firms attracted significant private R&D investment, illustrates
these features of how a science commons contributes value. Commercial interest in
genomics was intense during this period. Fierce competition between private sector
and public sector genomics programs was highly visible. Seemingly anomalous
behavior, such as private firms funding ‘‘open science,’’ can be explained by unusual
business dynamics between established firms wanting to preserve a robust science
commons to prevent startup firms from limiting established firms’ freedom to
operate. Deliberate policies to create and protect a large science commons were
pursued by nonprofit and government funders of genomics research, such as the
Wellcome Trust and National Institutes of Health. These policies were crucial to
keeping genomic data and research tools widely available at low cost.
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1 Introduction
When Robert Merton wrote about the sociology of science in the 1970s, the central
task at hand was explaining how a set of social norms and practices yielded
knowledge—what was different about science compared to the humanities and the
professions (Merton, 1973). John Ziman and others addressed what makes the
methods of science produce ‘‘reliable knowledge’’ (Ziman, 1978). This paper ad-
dresses a related, but somewhat different aspect of science—how reliable knowledge
can be turned into social benefit, using genomics as a case in point. The value of a
science commons—a pool of knowledge that is widely available at little or no
cost—is the central focus. The zone of intersection between reliable knowledge and
useful knowledge falls squarely into what the late Donald Stokes described as
‘‘Pasteur’s Quadrant,’’ (1997) where research results both contribute insight into the
workings of nature and at the same time find practical application.
The value of having knowledge widely and freely (or almost freely) available is
particularly salient in Pasteur’s Quadrant. Knowledge is more likely to advance, and
to be applied, if it is available at little or no expense to a broad array of scientists
and innovators. These features of network efficiency are well known in software and
other fields characterized by widely distributed cumulative innovation under
mantras such as ‘‘to many eyes, every bug is shallow,’’ and theoretically described by
Benckler (2002).
I shamelessly steal the term ‘‘science commons’’ from the new organization of that
name that has spun out of the Creative Commons movement. Science Commons is
dedicated to ‘‘making it easier for scientists, universities, and industries to use liter-
ature, data, and other scientific intellectual property and to share their knowledge
with others. Science Commons works within current copyright and patent law to
promote legal and technical mechanisms that remove barriers to sharing’’ (Science
Commons, 2005). (While I endorse their mission, they may not endorse my agenda or
analysis. I have no direct connection to the organization, and do not speak for it.)
The main approach in what follows is historical, using background on how the
science commons functioned in genomics to illustrate the role of a commons in
general. Genomics will be the main topic, occasionally straying into collateral fields
of biomedical research such as bioinformatics or molecular and cellular biology
when they provide better examples.
There is some fuzziness around the edges of what constitutes a science commons,
and how it relates to ‘‘the public domain.’’ There can be variants of many terms
marching under the banner of open science or public research. ‘‘Open access,’’ for
example, can mean free access to view information, but not necessarily freedom to use
it in all ways without restriction. The information in patents, for example, is openly
available, but users may need to get permission or pay fees to use a patented invention
(including some basic methods used in science). To some, open science means no one
can fence it in. Access to information, say through ‘‘viral’’ licensing or copyleft, may be
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conditioned on agreeing not to restrict subsequent users. Information may also simply
be put into the public domain for any and all subsequent uses, by deposit at a freely
available public database, for example. I focus on this last meaning, with information
available to all at low or no cost. But again, this may not mean completely unfettered
use, as sequence information in GenBank may be covered by patent claims. Jensen
and Murray, for example, noted that more than 4,000 human DNA sequences are
subject to claims in US patents (Jensen & Murray, 2005). Sometimes there are
restrictions on use of information and materials in the science commons, but those
restrictions must also impose low or no costs to subsequent users, or else that infor-
mation has left the science commons (e.g., through subsequent patenting, copyright, or
database protection). There is no bright line dividing the science commons from
proprietary R&D, and indeed in the case of some sequences, materials, and methods
in molecular biology, the expense associated with use of genomic information may
depend more on licensing terms and practices than what is or is not patented—and one
person’s ‘‘reasonable terms’’ may be out of reach for some users.
The world of genomics is not a simple world. Some of the data shown below, for
example, are drawn from a free public database, the DNA Patent Database at
Georgetown University (DNA Patent Database, 2005). That database is, in turn,
drawn from the freely available US Patent and Trademark Database (USPTO
Database, 2005). But the search engine and database used to generate the DNA
Patent Database are derived from an intermediate subscription database that is not
widely or freely available, but available to subscribers at several thousand dollars a
year, through the Delphion patent database (Delphion Database, 2005). Duke pays
a subscription to The Thomson Corporation for its use. This is a major tool for our
research, and for us the subscription cost is balanced by ease of use and reliability.
We pay for Delphion for its special features (such as corporate trees that track
ownership of patents) and because its search results have proven more reliable than
several alternatives, including the USPTO’s own computers and software available
in northern Virginia. We are happy to pay for a proprietary database because it helps
us do our work and the price is reasonable, within reach of our nonprofit institution.
Delphion does not restrict our use, and does not prevent our creating a free public
database. I raise the example of a pay-for-use database sandwiched between two
public resource databases to hint that the story will get complicated, and to signal
early that this is not a diatribe against for-profit intrusions into research. This is
important because many of the points that come out later will seem unfriendly to
purveyors of databases. Those objections are not deep-seated rejections of capital-
ism in science, but rather pragmatic judgments about adverse effects of particular
policies.
Innovation is exquisitely sensitive to policies of many kinds. Innovation depends
on how much information is produced as well as how widely and easily it is shared.
Funding of R&D is a major determinant of how much research is conducted, and
thereby how much information is created. Policies governing the science com-
mons—or alternative, more restricted informational spaces—determine how widely
and quickly information and materials are distributed. My purpose here is to high-
light why the science commons matters. Some reasons are obvious, but some are not
so obvious, and some are even counterintuitive.One final conceptual point will be
helpful to flag before proceeding into the narrative. There is extensive overlap
between ‘‘academic health research’’ and the science commons in molecular biology.
Academic science is important in many fields, not just the life sciences. In all lines of
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scientific and technical work, universities and nonprofit research institutions
and government laboratories (‘‘academic research institutions’’) play key roles.
Everyone is trained in academe, not just academic scientists, but also those working
in industry. And within industry, academic training is not just for those doing R&D,
but also managers and professionals. Academe is also one place where the norms of
Mertonian science have real traction, where the norms of openness, community,
mutual criticism, and fair allocation of credit are supposed to be respected, at least as
an ideal. In some circumstances, however, academic science is done under strictures
of secrecy, or results are made available only at great cost or encumbered by
restrictions on use. Such academic science is not part of a science commons. Great
science goes on in industry, including or even particularly in the life sciences, but no
one expects the norms of openness to prevail in industrial R&D, even if in some
circumstances at some times scientists in companies publish in the open literature,
present their findings at open scientific conferences, make materials freely available,
and contribute data to public databases. When industrial R&D is widely shared
openly, results flowing from industrial R&D can become part of the science com-
mons, and there are several instances of this in the stories to follow. In sum, most
academic research contributes to the science commons, and some industrial R&D
also does so. Most industrial R&D is proprietary, as is some academic research.
The science commons thus does not reduce to academic research. It remains true
nonetheless, that most of the science commons—at least in the life sciences—is
based on academic research funded by government and nonprofit organizations, and
most academic research probably enlarges the science commons, although to my
knowledge no one has quantitatively assessed what fraction of the research funded
by government and nonprofit organizations remains in the science commons. Poli-
cies put in place over the past three decades have raised concerns about how big the
science commons will be, and in particular, whether and to what degree government
and nonprofit funders and academic research institutions will maintain it. Richard
Nelson of Columbia University, in particular, has expressed concerns about intru-
sions on open science, based on his decades of studying the innovation process as an
economist (Nelson, 2006).
2 Genomics: public and private science in a fishbowl
Genomics became the grounds for a vigorous, sometimes even vicious, fight over
what should or should not be in the public domain, and under what conditions. Many
of the fights were over preserving the science commons. How much genomic data
should be in the science commons has been a matter of explicit policy-making in
government, nonprofits, academic institutions, and private firms since 1992 or 1993,
when the commercial promise of genomics became apparent, and private funding for
genomics in for-profit companies began to accelerate.
Several features of genomics make it an interesting field to study as an instance of
the science commons. It is clearly derived from a scientific project that was initially
conceived as a public works project—to construct maps and derive a reference
sequence of the human genome and other genomes. The original intent of the
Human Genome Project was to produce information and tools to make that infor-
mation useful and valuable. Some commercial uses were foreseen from the begin-
ning, but the main focus was on producing public data of permanent scientific value.
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The genome revolution began in the mid-1980s. It caught a wave of enthusiasm
for ‘‘the new biotechnology’’ that had become both scientifically hot and also a
darling on Wall Street. Cetus was founded in 1971 and turned to recombinant DNA
techniques soon after they were discovered (Stanley Cohen, co-inventor of re-
combinant DNA, joined the Cetus Board in 1975). Genentech was founded in 1976.
Those companies went public with high-profile stock offerings in 1980 and 1981,
raising sums that startled the markets (Smith Hughes, 2001).
The origins of the Human Genome Project were not in commercial biotechnol-
ogy, however, but in publicly funded science. The ideas behind the Human Genome
Project began to appear in 1985, while the embers of biotechnology were still warm
but too distant from this particular part of molecular biology to catch fire. (And not
for want of trying. Walter Gilbert tried to start Genome Corp. in 1987, for example,
and had to resign from a National Research Council study as a consequence.) Sci-
entists conceived a grand idea and focused on the scientific value of having a ref-
erence human genomic sequence (Cook-Deegan, 1994).1 Commercial interest
lagged for several years, until in 1991 a conflict over patenting short sequence tags
derived from human genes blew up into a major controversy, and created com-
mercial interest in human genomic sequencing.
J. Craig Venter, a scientist in NIH’s intramural (government laboratory) research
program, started using automated DNA sequencing machines rapidly to identify
sequences unique to human genes. A Genentech lawyer, Max Hensley, contacted
the NIH technology licensing lawyer, Reid Adler, who in turn contacted Venter
about filing a patent application on his method and the resulting DNA sequences.
The method was eventually given over to the public domain through a statutory
registration of invention, but the patent application for the sequences themselves
continued through the patent examination process. That 1991 patent application
generated tremendous controversy until 1994, when NIH Director Harold Varmus
decided to abandon the patents, following the advice of patent scholars Rebecca
Eisenberg and Robert Merges (1995).
The controversy at NIH paradoxically induced interest in commercial biotech-
nology circles. In 1991 and 1992, noise over ‘‘Darth Venter’s’’ turn to the dark side
(by patenting DNA sequences from gene fragments) attracted the attention of sci-
entist Randall Scott at Incyte in California, and Incyte began to focus on DNA
sequencing of human genes. Through 1994, several other companies—including
Human Genome Sciences, Mercator Genetics, Genset, Myriad Genetics, Millen-
nium Pharmaceuticals, Genome Therapeutics (renamed from Collaborate Re-
search), Hyseq, and Sequenom—were formed around the idea of mapping and/or
the sequencing the human genome, or turned from other pursuits to those ends.
One company illustrates the public-science origins of private genomics in par-
ticular: Human Genome Sciences. Wallace Steinberg, a former Johnson & Johnson
executive who had started several biotech companies after leaving J&J, decided to
meet Venter, having read about him amidst the patenting controversy. He talked
Venter into leaving NIH to form a nonprofit research unit, eventually named The
Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR), by promising Venter $70 million
($85 million by the time the deal was done) (Cook-Deegan, 1994). That was enough
to build a larger sequencing and sequence-analysis facility than existed anywhere
1 Robert Sinsheimer, Renato Dulbecco, and Charles DeLisi each independently proposed the idea
of sequencing the human genome.
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else at the time. Human Genome Sciences Inc. (HGSI), was formed as a for-profit
corporation that would own the patent rights to TIGR’s results as well as pursuing its
own research leads. There were also plans to form additional companies, Industrial
Genome Sciences and Plant Genome Sciences, to exploit different opportunities
deriving from high-throughput sequencing and other genomic technologies. Stein-
berg tapped William Haseltine to become chief executive at HGSI. Haseltine had
been involved in several previous Steinberg startup firms. Haseltine also had his
roots in academic science, most notably from his work on HIV/AIDS at Harvard.
Genomics startups were a subgroup of biotech startups. The first boomlet in
genomics startups in the early 1990s paralleled a significant increase in pharma-
ceutical R&D among established pharma and biotech firms that started in the early
1980s. The 1980s marked an intensification of competition among pharma companies
based on R&D. A pharmaceutical R&D arms race of sorts began in the early 1980s,
and during that decade, firms delved ever more deeply into molecular and cellular
biology to bolster their ‘‘absorptive capacity’’ for drug discovery (Cockburn &
Henderson, 1998; Fabrizio, 2005, unpublished data), recognizing the importance of
rapid and effective use of public domain science to their business plans. Not all
companies did this with equal success. Indeed, their ability to tap public science was
one of the indicators of firms’ success in pharmaceuticals (Fabrizio, 2004).
By historical happenstance, this birth of genomics out of publicly funded science
took place as patent rights were being expanded and strengthened, by a combination
of changes in legislation, in court decisions, and in patent offices. In academia, the
major change was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which gave grantees and contractors
rights—and indeed a mandate—to seek patents on federally funded research results.
Mowery and his coauthors review this history and some of its consequences in their
book, Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation, which combines economic empiricism,
historical research, and policy analysis (Mowery et al., 2004).
Genomics, because of its timing as well as its commercial relevance—foreseeable
to some immediately, to others a few years after its launch—took root as a field in
American academe under the new Bayh-Dole regime. Academic institutions began
to patent much more frequently after 1980, and genomics is one of the areas where
this effect was pronounced. Moreover, patent rights were being expanded and
strengthened in many areas of American law, including biotechnology. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was formed in 1982. It was designed to
handle appeals of certain cases, including appeals of federal district court decisions
about patent litigation. The CAFC quickly established itself as a generally pro-
patent court. It and the patent office expanded the kinds of inventions that could be
patented (including software and business methods, for example) and tended to
strengthen the hand of patent-holders relative to those contesting patent rights (Jaffe
& Lerner, 2005). In the hands of the CAFC, more territory could be enclosed and
patent fences generally got higher. These developments had a particularly strong
impact on areas of rapid innovation, including both ‘‘wet lab’’ biotechnology and
bioinformatics, fields directly relevant to genomics.
Three other factors are not related to changes in policy, but nonetheless make
genomics a useful field to study for this policy history: (1) the story was compressed
into a decade, so its narrative is shorter and crisper, (2) there was intense media
coverage, producing an ample public record of events, and (3) the patentable
inventions arising from genomics can be tracked because it is possible to identify
relevant patents. Patents resulting from genomics R&D almost always make patent
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claims that use terms distinctive to DNA and RNA, which can be used to create a
searchable patent database mapping to genomics research.2
3 Work enabled by a science commons
A science commons can supply information needed to achieve social benefit that for-
profit markets in goods and services may fail to achieve. Moreover, even in markets
well served by the profit motive, a science commons can in some circumstances
improve efficiency, when many disparate firms can draw on a common pool of
knowledge and data, rather than having to construct the same information firm-by-
firm at substantial cost because of duplication. One theoretical rationale for this
effect has been set forth by Benkler (2002). The cases arising in genomics suggest
that network theory may have some practical applications in the real world of sci-
ence and its application. I will illustrate three social goals that can benefit from a
robust scientific commons in genomics: advancing science, improving public health,
and creating a shared foundation for productively diverse forms of industrial R&D
and commercialization. But first, some historical background.
4 Public and private genomics in mortal combat
The beginning of the Human Genome Project was marked by conflict between
scientists who thought it was a poor use of resources versus those who thought it was
a useful and efficient way to spend public research dollars. By broadening the project
to include maps, tools, and organisms in addition to the human, most scientists came
around to support the Project. A 1988 report of the National Research Council
reported that consensus (National Research Council, 1998). That did not eliminate
all conflict, however, because the question of which federal agency should play the
larger role remained unresolved, and both the National Institutes of Health and the
Department of Energy assumed active roles, in a roughly 2–1 ratio of funding. And
even as the rival agencies in the US settled into a generally amicable cooperative
framework, other nations began to engage in genomics R&D.
The 1991 controversy over gene-tagging sequences erupted while the Genome
Project was getting underway. As that controversy died down, an even more public
conflict over sequencing the entire genome exploded in 1998, pitting a private
company against the public sector genome project. The battleground for both these
two conflicts was the science commons.
TIGR and HGSI were formed in 1992. The heads of the two private organizations,
Venter (TIGR) and Haseltine (HGSI), never sang close harmony, despite their
supposed corporate matrimony. As TIGR moved away from human gene sequencing
and into microbial sequencing, including proof of principle that whole-genome
2 This is not true of patent collections based on ‘‘gene patents,’’ which flag patents containing
sequence data (amino-acid or nucleic acid sequences from peptides and nucleic acid structures). The
main reason is that many DNA-based patents claim methods, algorithms, or compositions other than
DNA or RNA sequences. The algorithm for selecting patents into the DNA Patent Database is
available at the site, http://dnapatents.georgetown.edu/SearchAlgorithm-Delphion-20030512.htm
(accessed 2 April 2005). All patent studies have fuzzy edges, but the database is a tool that captures
patents roughly corresponding to genetics and genomics.
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shotgun sequencing could work, the noise from the TIGR-HGSI conflict got down-
right cacophonous. TIGR’s scientific interests hardly coincided with what HGSI
would want from its R&D partner, and two alpha-males confined in close corporate
space found themselves in frequent conflict. In 1997, TIGR and HGSI severed their
ties, with TIGR foregoing rights to future payments and HGSI foregoing rights to
future TIGR discoveries (TIGR, 1997). It was a divorce made in heaven.
Venter became a free agent, heading up a free-standing nonprofit research
institute, until Michael Hunkapiller of Applied Biosystems approached him with
another Big Idea (Shreeve, 2004). In discussions with its parent company (then
Perkin-Elmer Cetus, which became Applera), Applied Biosystems had begun to
think seriously about sequencing the human genome with private funds. It would be
a high-profile use of a promising new DNA sequencing instrument that was much
faster and more scalable than existing sequencers. The question was whether the
methods TIGR had used on smaller genomes, such as bacteria, could work on the
human genome, and produce a final sequence faster than the public genome project.
If so, a company could charge both for access to the data, and for access to infor-
matic tools to mine the data. In order to charge users, the company would need a
truly impressive bioinformatic capacity, and great tools for analyzing sequence data.
If a private company decided to sequence the genome, it might even kick up a
market for sequencing instruments, including Applied Biosystems machines, among
the publicly funded laboratories doing DNA sequencing, who would buy the same
machines to compete with the new genomic sequencing company.
In May 1998, Craig Venter became the head of a company, later named Celera
Genomics, which would carry out the sequencing and pull together the computing
infrastructure to assemble it into a reference sequence, and then begin to interpret
the sequence information. Celera’s 1998 establishment inaugurated another boom in
genomics startups, this one entailing many more companies and much more money
than the 1992–1994 boomlet.
The ‘‘private genome project’’ idea gathered steam and was announced through a
sophisticated media roll-out strategy. The initial kernel of the media snowball was an
exclusive to Nicholas Wade of the New York Times in May 1998 (Wade, 1998). Thus
began a privately financed scientific effort at Celera running into the hundreds of
millions of dollars that competed head to head with the publicly financed Human
Genome Project. The drama played out over 3 years and became the biggest story in
science, and one of the most visible general interest stories of its period.
The story is often told as a race, competition between Venter at Celera and the
public Human Genome Project whose most conspicuous spokesmen were Francis
Collins in the United States and Sir John Sulston in the United Kingdom. Collins
was director of the National Human Genome Research Institute at NIH, and Sulston
directed the Sanger Institute affiliated with the University of Cambridge and funded
mainly by the Wellcome Trust of London (with additional funding from the UK
Medical Research Council). The usual narrative strategy was to use the metaphor of
a race, but in fact there were not just two human genome projects running in parallel,
there were many.
A consortium of laboratories funded by government agencies and nonprofit
organizations in North America, Europe, and Japan constituted the ‘‘public genome
project.’’ Sulston emerged as the champion of that faction, emphasizing open sci-
ence, rapid sharing of data and materials, and a passionate appeal to refrain from
patenting bits of the human genome except when they could foreseeably induce
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investment in developing end-products such as therapeutic proteins. Sulston was the
leader and rhetorical warrior for Open Science.
Sulston’s model for the human genome project was the biology of the worm
(Ankeny, 2001)—a close-knit community of scientists who studied nematodes, and
had made immense scientific progress in a hub-and-spoke model of biology. Two
central laboratories—one at the University of Cambridge and another at Washing-
ton University in Saint Louis—did high-tech, whiz-bang, expensive mapping and
sequencing projects on the worm genome. Those hubs shared data quickly and
widely with the spokes—a vibrant network of smaller laboratories throughout the
world. Sulston wrote The Common Thread with Georgina Ferry to tell the genome
story from his point of view (Sulston & Ferry, 2002). His was the public works model
of genomics, with public funding producing a valuable scientific resource.
The Wellcome Trust was the crucial nonprofit funder that supported this open
science model. Michael Morgan from Wellcome Trust believed fervently in open
science, and wanted the ‘‘public’’ genome project to succeed. The Sanger Institute
was the Trust’s foremost research institution, and John Sulston its most visible sci-
entist. NIH and Francis Collins, as a government organization and employee,
respectively, had to be more cautious in their rhetoric—and were, most of the time.
The Wellcome Trust sponsored a Bermuda meeting of the major sequencing
centers throughout the world in 1996 (despite the exotic sound of it, the weather was
miserable, it was off-season, and the site was chosen deliberately to be neutral, not in
the USA or Europe). One theme of the meeting was how to make sequence data
widely available, modeled on the worm science world. A set of ‘‘Bermuda Rules’’
emerged from the meeting, mandating daily disclosure of DNA sequence data. The
pledge to rapidly share data was linked to a plea not to patent DNA, unless a gene or
DNA sequence had been studied further to show its function or practical utility.
That kind of functional biology was not the business of the publicly funded DNA
sequencing centers, so it was in effect a ‘‘no patents’’ policy for the sequencing
centers. Venter was present at the beginning of the Bermuda meeting, in his pre-
Celera days as head of TIGR, but fittingly he left early and was gone by the time the
Bermuda Rules were agreed. This left him room to later repudiate them.
The Wellcome Trust played another important role in 1998, soon after Venter
announced his intention to sequence the genome at a new startup company. Well-
come reacted to the announcement of the new company by proposing to do a faster,
better public genome sequence by increasing its commitment to fund genomic
sequencing through the public project. Wellcome’s move, in turn, bolstered funding
from the US government, UK government, and other government and nonprofit
funders of the public genome project.
In addition to the upstart startup Celera and the public genome project, the
private firms HGSI and Incyte were in effect conducting a different kind of genome
project in parallel—call it a Human Genes Project. Their strategy centered on hu-
man gene sequences—DNA coding for protein products. Both companies had been
sequencing genes for 5–6 years before Celera was even formed, and had been
sending in patent applications the whole time. Incyte worked with a group of
pharmaceutical company subscribers. HGSI had one main client—SmithKline
Beecham (which later merged with Glaxo Wellcome to become Glaxo SmithKline).
The business strategies of Incyte and HGSI were both initially based on
sequencing human genes. Their styles were quite different, however. Randall Scott
at Incyte was part of a scientific network with many links to the public genome
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project. Indeed, at times Incyte was contemplated as a partner in the public
project (Shreeve, 2004). HGSI had some academic and industrial collaborations
beyond SmithKline Beecham, but far fewer than Incyte. And Haseltine’s relation to
the public genome project was as an outsider. Scott of Incyte was in the public
genome family, or at least ate some meals with them; Haseltine was never welcome
at the table.
Haseltine reinforced his role as troublemaker for the public genome project when
he wrote a 1998 editorial to the New York Times arguing Congress should pull the
plug on the public project because it was already being done ‘‘without tax money’’ by
his company and others (Haseltine, 1998). Haseltine argued government funds for
DNA sequencing would be better spent on smaller projects in individual laboratories
to understand gene sequences. There were two problems with this argument. First, it
assumed almost all the value of sequencing came from gene sequences, whereas
molecular genetics has become focused on many regulatory processes that happen at
the RNA and DNA level and are never translated into protein. It seems a safe bet
that a lot of biology would never be approachable if we only got protein-coding
sequences. Haseltine is an excellent scientist and knew this full well, although for
commercial purposes, he could certainly make a good case that the most rapid
returns were likely to come from coding sequences. This argument conflated com-
mercial value with scientific value, but as an argument about public support for
science, it is simply wrong, as the complexity of gene regulation is becoming obvious,
and the importance of DNA sequences in addition to protein-coding regions is
becoming apparent. Gene-based strategies made eminently good sense when hunt-
ing for drug targets, because drugs are designed to interact with proteins that are
secreted outside of cells, that bind DNA, or that extend outward from the surface of
cells. But as a tool to understand biology, the entire sequence was a much more
powerful tool than just protein-coding regions.
The even deeper flaw in Haseltine’s argument was about access to genomic
information. Here he crossed the line from perhaps inadvertently disingenuous to
deliberately misleading. The fact that genes were being sequenced by companies did
no one but those companies any good if the sequences were not public. Academic
scientists could, of course, approach HGSI or Incyte or other companies to collab-
orate, getting access to their data, but relatively few did so. The reason was that such
collaboration came with strings—or ropes, or even cables. The constraints were
patent rights—that is, exclusive property rights that were routinely being granted for
full-length genes by the US Patent and Trademark Office. Collaboration with HGSI
or Incyte meant nondisclosure agreements, publication review, and rights on
resulting intellectual property. Sometimes this made sense, but it was not terribly
attractive for those mainly interested in advancing science. A central condition of
collaboration was control of information and constraints on open sharing of data. It
made sense in a business context, but as a public works project in science, it made
none. And to argue that proprietary gene sequencing was a substitute for public
funding of genomic sequencing was ridiculous. Scientists could of course wait for
patents to issue from privately sequenced genes, but that was not really a practical
option because of the many-year delay. Perhaps scientists could hope HGSI and
Incyte would publish the sequences voluntarily someday, but the companies would
do that only when patents issued, or if it suited their business needs. The companies
did publish, but only very selectively. To academic scientists in the field, waiting for
companies to do the work would be surrendering to the competition in any event.
142 R. Cook-Deegan
123
Pharmaceutical companies working with the Incyte and HGSI played from
power—money and the ability to generate the data themselves if need be with their
huge R&D war chests. Small academic laboratories were on the other end of the
power curve, with relatively little leverage. Academic laboratories had a much better
alternative, to scan the public GenBank for genes of interest, at no cost and with no
strings attached. GenBank and other databases received sequences from thousands
of laboratories throughout the world, as well as (eventually) the output of major
DNA sequencing centers. Incyte and HGSI drew regularly on GenBank data, but
company gene sequence data made their way back to public sequence databases only
when a patent issued, or if the company chose to publish an article in the scientific
literature.3 In effect, company projects built on the foundation laid by the public
genome project and drew regularly upon its data, but only occasionally contributed
data back to public databases. This was sensible business practice, but it was mis-
leading for Haseltine to imply that leaving the genome projects to companies and
small laboratories would produce a genome project with the desired features of the
concerted public project.
One forthright way to make Haseltine’s case would have been to indeed allow the
private gene sequencing firms to proceed, but for the government and nonprofit
funders to pay to make the data public. There are two reasons Haseltine may have
chosen not to take his arguments to this logical conclusion. First, the offer would
likely have been refused by the companies, because their business plan was precisely
to keep sequence data proprietary until they could be patented. Government pro-
curement of the data would have vitiated this business plan, and turned the com-
panies into contractors. The second reason was price. It would have been
embarrassingly high, and certainly would have undercut the argument the work
could be done ‘‘with no tax dollars.’’ But pushed to its conclusion, Haseltine’s line of
argument could have made a clean case—it might have made sense for the gov-
ernment to buy this particular genomic real estate and dedicate it to the science
commons, if the private sector could produce the data faster and cheaper. Haseltine
started from the premise that human gene sequence data were valuable—and who
could argue with that?
From 1998 until February 2001, when Nature and Science published rival articles
containing draft reference sequences of the human genome prepared by the public
genome project (Lander et al., 2001) and by Celera (Venter et al., 2001), there
were in effect two competing projects focused on sequencing the entire human
genome, and in parallel also several other ‘‘genome projects’’ focused on expressed
sequences and bits and pieces of the genome of interest to research communities in
both public and private sectors. In addition to the two companies sequencing
human genes, many other companies were mapping and sequencing parts of the
human genome. And thousands of laboratories were contributing sequencing and
mapping information to databases and to scientific publications. By the time the
initial genomic sequence publications came out, the ratio of private to public
3 After November 1999, a US patent application was published 18 months after being filed, if the
applicant sought patent rights in any country with an 18-month publication rule. The companies did
also publish occasionally in the scientific literature. HGSI, for example, listed 70 publications with
one or more HGSI authors as of March 2005 on its website. These publications sometimes included
sequence data, and if so, would make their way to GenBank, often before publication of the cor-
responding patent or patent application.
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funding appeared to be roughly two private dollars for every one government or
nonprofit dollar (see Fig. 1).4
In 2001, the financial genome bubble burst. At the end of 2000, 74 publicly traded
firms were valued at $94 billion, of which the largest 15 accounted for approximately
$50 billion. By the end of 2002, those 15 firms’ market value had dropped to $10
billion, but their reported R&D expenditures nonetheless climbed from $1 to $1.7
billion (Kaufman, Johnson & Cook-Deegan, 2004, unpublished data).
These data make three simple points: First, the private sector has invested heavily
in genomics, but those investments are made in expectation of financial return. That
is quite different from the public and nonprofit funding of genomics, which is mainly
intended to produce public goods—knowledge and materials that are widely avail-
able to advance knowledge and combat disease. Second, private R&D investment is
a powerful complement to the public and nonprofit funding. Private R&D follows
public R&D in time, it draws on the science commons but does not necessarily
contribute back to it. If successful, private R&D investment can create wealth and
jobs as well as the social benefit from developing goods and services that would
otherwise not be produced. This benefit is real, but it is distinct from the social value
of the science commons.
Genomics also provides several examples of private funding to augment the science
commons, such as the SNP Consortium, and the Merck funding to Washington
University to fund gene sequencing (Cook-Deegan & McCormack, 2001). And third,
and most to the point for policy purposes, it would be foolhardy to generalize from the
happy circumstances when private R&D expands the science commons—to expect
private R&D to substitute for the science commons except in unusual circumstances,

















Fig. 1 Genomics Research Funding, 2000, Source: World Survey of Funding for Genomics Research,
Stanford University, 2001 (unpublished data from Robert Cook–Deegan, Amber Johnson, and
Carmie Chan, Stanford-in-Washington Program, based on a survey of over 200 funders)
4 In a snapshot taken of year 2000 genomics research funding, ~70 nonprofit and government
funders provided an estimated $1.6–1.7 billion; 74 publicly traded firms dedicated wholly to or
including genomics research as a major function reported over $2 billion in R&D expenditures; and
projecting 3–5% of R&D in major pharmaceutical firms was for genomics (based on survey re-
sponses and rough informal estimates of pharma R&D managers), established pharma firms were
spending $800 million to $1 billion in genomics research. [World Survey of Funding for Genomics
Research, Stanford-in-Washington program http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/genom-
ics/entry.htm (accessed 2 April 2005)].
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sector. Private industrial R&D will sometimes find it useful to contribute to the
science commons, but expecting industry to do so always and consistently would be
foolhardy.
5 Applications in public health: when markets fail
To see why having a healthy science commons matters, we move away from ge-
nomics to make a general point about health research. Murphy and Topel estimated
that the gains in life expectancy from medical research 1970 to 1990 were stagger-
ing—in the range of $2.8 trillion per year ($1.5 trillion of this from cardiovascular
disease reduction alone) (Murphy & Topel, 1999). Many of the health benefits of
discovering new information about health and disease come not from drugs or
vaccines or medical services, but from individuals acting on information. Cutler and
Kadiyala attributed 2/3 of the health gains in cardiovascular disease reduction to
effects of ‘‘public information,’’ such as stopping or reducing tobacco use, changing
diet, getting more exercise, or monitoring one’s blood pressure. The second largest
determinant was technological change, such as introduction of new drugs and ser-
vices, followed by increasing cigarette taxes to reduce tobacco use (Cutler &
Kadiyala, 2001). The estimated return on investment in medical treatment was 4–1,
but on the ‘‘public information’’ it was 30–1.
Cutler and Kadiyala’s result cannot be generalized, because smoking is a very
large risk factor that is sui generis, and cardiovascular disease has proven far more
malleable to many kinds of interventions than nonlung cancer and other chronic
diseases. The path from scientific understanding of cause to prevention of cancer,
diabetes, arthritis, and Alzheimer’s disease, among others, appears far less linear,
and so the value of public information about risk is correspondingly less powerful
and has less impact on health outcomes. Few if any risk factors will ever be found to
rival tobacco use as predictors of poor health. But the finding that information can
have value irrespective of being translated into products and services in a paying
market is nonetheless important. Even if public information will not be quite as
powerful in reducing other chronic diseases as it has been for cardiovascular disease,
the vector is likely to point in the same direction. We cannot say that public infor-
mation will always prove more powerful than information channeled into new drugs,
vaccines, biologics, devices, and medical services sold for profit in the health care
system. Where there are public health benefits from public research results, how-
ever—and the probability there will be no such public health effects of genomics
seems vanishingly small—the health science commons is essential, because it alone
can supply the public information benefits. Both words in ‘‘public information’’ do a
lot of work. We need new information that arises from science, but to capture social
benefits based on that knowledge itself, we also need it to be public.
Genomics provides several other examples of how public information is valuable.
The 2002 report from the World Health Organization, Genomics and World Health
gave the example of fosmidomycin (Advisory Committee on Health Research,
2002). This drug is currently being testing to treat malaria in Africa (Missinou et al.,
2002). That use came to light as a consequence of sequencing the genome of the
malaria parasite, and noticing a metabolic pathway not previously known to exist.
The compound fosmidomycin was known to inhibit the pathway, and had been
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developed as a treatment for urinary tract infections. When the new possible use to
treat malaria was revealed, fosmidomycin was pulled off the shelf and moved into
clinical trials against malaria. This is a treatment that may never turn a profit for any
company, but the social returns could be enormous if fosmidomycin works, because
so many millions of people are infected with malaria. If not fosmidomycin, then
perhaps other findings will lead to prevention or treatment of malaria, enabled by
now having the full genomic sequence available for host, pathogen, and mosquito
vector (Gardner et al., 2002; Holt et al., 2002). Making the information about these
organisms available worldwide is essential to accruing the benefits of research. There
is only a weak world market for drugs to treat malaria because it is largely an
affliction in resource-poor populations. The usual profit motives of the intellectual
property system cannot create incentives where there is no prospect of profit to pull
products through an expensive discovery and testing process. But networks of
nonprofit organizations, such as the Malaria Vaccine Initiative, the Global Fund, the
WHO essential medicines program, and other sources of ‘‘public’’ capital might
nonetheless be capable of discovering and developing new treatments despite the
unlikely prospect of commercial profit.5 In theory, public funds might induce a
sufficient incentive to motivate profit-driven investments for diseases of poor people
living in poor countries, but it is not true now, and betting that money will be found
could prove wrong. Having a scientific commons with information relevant to vac-
cines and treatments at least offers an alternative pathway. Many of the scientists
most motivated to study such diseases work in resource-poor countries; they do not
have rich resources, but they do have strong motivation, as well as computers and
access to public databases.
Another case example is SARS. Strains of the coronavirus that causes SARS were
identified and sequenced within a month by at least three laboratories in Asia,
Canada, and the United States. That sequence information was shared widely, and a
‘‘chip’’ to detect the virus was available for research and possible clinical use just a
few months later. Making progress with such alacrity requires strong norms of open
science, with obvious social benefit.6
Many of the infectious diseases that plague mankind have long eluded measures
to combat them. In many cases, this is because they are difficult to grow in tissue
culture, and therefore research progress is slow. With new technology, the genomes
of hundreds of ‘‘nasty bugs’’ have been fully sequenced, giving scientists an entirely
new tool to develop drugs, vaccines, and control measures. It is far from clear that
this will tilt the battle decisively in favor of humans over schistosomes, trypano-
somes, plasmodia, bacteria, viruses, and other organisms that maim and kill humans
by the billions, but it is a new line of attack. In the case of organisms on the Select
Agent list of ‘‘bioterror’’ bugs, there is now extensive research underway to develop
5 My colleagues Anthony So, Arti Rai, Jerry Reichman, Henry Grabowski, and others at Duke have
joined many others from around the world to seek creative ways to ensure that essential drugs and
vaccines are developed.
6 This story of sharing sequence information is commingled with a potential intellectual property
story that could be complicated. At least three of the institutions that did the sequencing have
applied for patents, and interference proceedings could be complex, as they are in different countries
and on different strains that might need to be cross-licensed for many practical applications. A
patent pool could emerge, or a monster interference proceeding to sort out the questions of in-
ventorship. The legal costs could exceed the costs of deriving the sequence itself. See E. Richard
Gold 2003. SARS Genome Patent: Symptom or Disease? The Lancet (361): 2002–2003.
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preventive and treatment measures. For most infectious agents that afflict those in
the poorest parts of the world, however, the prospect of profit will not create a
demand-pull for innovation that could improve billions of human lives, unless
indirect incentives such as prizes or guaranteed payments for effective remedies by
third parties serve as surrogates for paying markets.
Unlike the ‘‘public information’’ case described above, however, here the market
failure has a different cause. It is not due to the fact that the research results are
‘‘public goods,’’ but because the potential users are deeply impoverished, and the
economic incentives for drug development in advanced economies do not prevail.
The failure here is one of profound inequality and distributive injustice. Nongov-
ernment organizations around the globe, including major funders such as the Gates
Foundation, the TB Alliance, the Global Fund, and others, are attempting to use
philanthropy, government funding, and creative networking to address this form of
market failure. Their efforts depend critically on access to scientific and technical
information at low or no cost. Success on this front thus depends critically on the
health of the scientific commons.
Another likely use of genomic information will be newborn screening, as more
diseases are characterized, linked to possible intervention, and incorporated into
routine testing. This must be done with care to avoid harms and false positives, but
as knowledge accumulates, the list of conditions that can be treated will lengthen,
and costs of testing should drop. Any benefits from newborn screening are unlikely
to arise from strong profit motives, however, as most testing is done by state-funded
laboratories in the United States and government public health programs in most
other countries. The dollar amounts are small. [Two-thirds of US states spent be-
tween $20 and $40 per infant for all screening in 2002, and no state spent more than
$61 (US General Accounting Office, 2003)]. This is far less than most single genetic
tests, or even routine medical laboratory tests. Newborn screening is now, and will
likely continue to be, a public health service (Newborn Screening Steering Com-
mittee, 2005). Any shift to DNA-based testing, or addition of tests beyond the
current testing regimes, will face very serious cost constraints, and advances are
unlikely to result from prospect of ample profits in this market.
6 Public inputs to private science
Even if we were to stipulate that the ‘‘public information’’ impact of health research
might be less important in the future than it has been in the past, does it diminish the
role and importance of the science commons? In this section, the focus is not on
social benefits foregone for lack of a robust commons. Instead, the argument shifts to
efficiency gains to private R&D that follow from being able to draw upon the
commons.
Several lines of research corroborate the intuition that a pool of public infor-
mation and materials must surely ‘‘raise all ships’’ to the benefit of each. The case is
likely to be stronger in health research than in other lines of research, just because of
the well known deep mutualism between public and private R&D in health research.
The late Edwin Mansfield’s surveys of industrial leaders clearly showed that
executives in firms believed their lines of business-related R&D depended on
academic research, and pharmaceuticals to a greater degree than any other sector he
characterized (Mansfield, 1995). Narin and colleagues have repeatedly shown how
The science commons in health research 147
123
industrial publications cite academic research, and patents related to pharmaceuti-
cals and biotechnology cite academic research far more heavily than most other
kinds of inventions (Narin & Olivastro, 1992). When Steve McCormack and I read
through the more than 1,000 DNA-based US patents issued 1980–1993, we found
that 42%were assigned to universities (14% to private; 9% to public), nonprofit
institutions (13%), or government (six percent), compared to less than three percent
academic ownership of patents overall (McCormack & Cook-Deegan, 1996–1997,
unpublished data). This is a tenfold enrichment of academic involvement in life
sciences compared to most other kinds of invention.
The 1997 survey of the Association of University Technology Managers was the
last year for which the questions made it possible to analyze life sciences separately
from physical sciences. That year, life sciences accounted for 70 percent of licenses
and 87% of income (Massing, 1998).7 Industries closest to health research depend on
academe, and academic institutions are more heavily involved in technology transfer
activities related to the life sciences. If we were looking for a place where public
science matters to industry, life sciences would be a good place to start.
What is really going on? Beyond the special role of academic institutions as the
training grounds for both technical and nontechnical workers in the knowledge
economy, academic institutions also play a unique role in creating and sustaining the
science commons. It is worth noting that the studies above generally focus on aca-
demic R&D, not specifically on the science commons, or only ‘‘open science.’’ Recall
that universities and nonprofit research centers do not always practice open science,
and some elements in the commons come from private industry R&D. Academic
research institutions are nonetheless the main stewards of the science commons.
While we cannot be completely sure, it is quite likely that the main explanation for
the importance of academic research is that it is open, producing data and materials
available to all.
The most direct line of evidence for this comes from the Carnegie-Mellon Survey
of industrial R&D managers. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh conclude that ‘‘public re-
search has a substantial impact on industrial R&D in a few industries, particularly
pharmaceuticals,’’ and
‘‘The most important channels for accessing public research appear to be the
public and personal channels (such as publications, conferences, and informal
interactions), rather than, say, licenses or cooperative ventures. Finally, we find
that large firms are more likely to use public research than small firms, with the
exception that start-up firms also make particular use of public research,
especially in pharmaceuticals (Cohen et al., 2002)’’.
This certainly corroborates the stories of genomics startup companies, including
companies like Celera, depending heavily on their recent past in academic research,
and their ongoing collaborations with (and sometimes customers and markets in)
academic research. And it confirms the role of large firms in preferring to draw
inputs from a science commons, rather than having to collect atomized, individually
expensive fragments of proprietary technologies and data.
7 The AUTM survey has continued in subsequent years, but the questions separating life sciences




The history of genomics provides many examples of this, but two are particularly
famous. One salient example is the decision in the period 1988–1991 by the National
Institutes of Health not to sequence human genes (i.e., protein-coding regions), but
instead to focus on systematically mapping and sequencing the entire genome
(Cook-Deegan, 2003). That decision opened the way for private firms Human
Genome Sciences and Incyte to fill the void, attracting private capital to do what the
public sector had chosen not to do. Because it fell victim to the law of unintended
effects, NIH’s decision not to pursue cDNA sequencing, however well-intended and
understandable, was a mistake in retrospect.
The story behind that decision is mainly about the sociology of science, not a
theory of the science commons, but it is instructive nonetheless. The decision not to
sequence protein-coding regions was initially about fairness between big labs and
small ones, not about commercial prospects. As the genome project took shape, the
importance of maps of humans and various ‘‘model organisms’’ was apparent. What
kinds of maps deserved substantial funding and concerted effort remained, however,
a matter of ongoing dispute. One of the bones of contention was a ‘‘gene map’’
based on cDNA technology—that is, making DNA copies of the messenger RNA
translated into protein within cells. Construction of cDNA libraries was standard
fare, and remains a seminal technology in efforts to study expression of many genes
through microarray technologies.
One question left open during the early debates about the Human Genome
Project, 1987–1991, was whether the genome project would include ‘‘gene’’
sequencing—to start sequencing efforts with DNA known to code for protein, and
therefore certain to provide codes for most of the important building blocks of cells,
while also providing targets for drug development. A technical means to isolate the
RNA that is translated into proteins was readily available. DNA could be made from
such RNA molecules. This was called cDNA technology, ‘‘complementary’’ to the
messenger RNA that is exported from the nucleus of the cell to its cytoplasm to be
translated into protein. In fact, one could take it a step further and look for genes
coding proteins likely to be of particular biological significance—and focus on just
those cDNAs coding for secreted proteins and peptides (such as hormones or
neurotransmitters), for receptor or transporter molecules extending outside the cell
(with many trans-membrane domains), or proteins that bind DNA (with ‘‘zinc fin-
gers), etc. These ‘‘functional motifs’’ could be predicted, if imperfectly, from DNA
sequence data. One logical strategy to start the DNA sequencing program was to
sequence cDNAs of particular interest first, then other cDNAs, and then turn to
‘‘genomic’’ DNA between genes. (DNA between genes would still be of interest
because such sequences were likely to house regulatory signals for turning genes on
and off, and affecting the timing of gene expression, as well as structures involved in
cell division and the 3-dimensional shape of DNA in cells.)
At one of the first public discussions of the human genome project, at Cold Spring
Harbor in June 1986, Walter Gilbert responded to one attack on the idea of
sequencing the genome by noting, ‘‘of course you would start by sequencing the
cDNAs’’ (Gilbert, 1986). When the congressional Office of Technology Assessment
presented a plausible budget for funding the genome project, it included a cDNA
sequencing component (US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1988). The
Department of Energy did pursue some cDNA sequencing, but NIH’s genome
program did not. It was a matter of some discussion, but in the end it was largely
James Watson’s call, as director of the relevant NIH center. Several arguments were
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made against cDNA sequencing. First, it was already going to happen, since
incentives to find genes were strong with funding from other NIH institutes, but
incentives for individual labs to produce whole genomic sequence data were entirely
dependent on ‘‘genome project’’ funding. Another, related, argument was about the
sociology of science—if big sequencing centers did cDNA sequencing, they would
inevitably also be at least tempted to pause to characterize particularly interesting
genes, and turn to the fascinating biology sure to follow. There were two problems
with this: (1) it would distract them from the major task at hand of deriving a
complete reference sequence of the entire genome, and (2) it would give them an
unfair advantage over the thousands of smaller laboratories lacking the DNA
sequencing firepower.
It was the NIH decision not to fund cDNA sequencing that left the door open to
Incyte and HGSI to follow human cDNA sequencing with private funding, because
in the absence of a big public effort, the low-hanging fruit of the genome was there to
be plucked, sequenced, and shipped off with claims to the patent office.
When Incyte and HGSI began to go down this path, those who saw genes as
increasingly important inputs to their R&D efforts—particularly large pharmaceu-
tical companies—got concerned, for two reasons. One was that the US Patent and
Trademark Office was obviously patent-friendly, industry-oriented, and seemingly
tone-deaf to the concerns of scientists about enclosing the public domain. Patents
would issue. And if patents were granted, then any firm making, using or selling a
gene or gene fragment could be hit up for a piece of the action by the company that
first sequenced it. Incyte and HGSI were clearly capable of filing patent applications
on hundreds of thousands of gene tags, and thousands of full-length genes. More-
over, the small genomic startups had a running start on large pharmaceutical firms,
the plodding Apatosaurus’s of the biotech Jurassic.
Merck decided to take action (Williamson, 1999).8 It stepped forward to fund a
public domain sequencing effort, starting with gene fragments and moving on to full-
length cDNAs. The work was to be done at Washington University in Saint Louis,
home of one of the largest public genome sequencing facilities, and the data were to
be moved quickly into the public domain.
Merck funded the work through a nonprofit arm and had no privileged access to
the data. Here was a large company funding data to flow into the science commons
where it would be freely available to all. Why would it do this? Four reasons suggest
themselves: (1) it poisoned the well for Incyte, HGSI, and other startup firms, cre-
ating an open, academic competitor (albeit funded by industry) to shut the window
on securing exclusive property rights on genes, and thus limiting the number of genes
that would be have to be licensed; (2) it built good will with scientists, vital col-
laborators in Merck’s drug discovery efforts; (3) it was great PR; and (4) it took
8 An excerpt from the press statement upon the first data release explained some details: ‘‘The
Merck Gene Index is a broad collaborative effort, coordinated by Dr. Alan Williamson, Vice
president, Research Strategy Worldwide, and Keith O. Elliston, Associate Director, Bioinformatics,
of the Merck Research Laboratories. Dr. Greg Lennon’s laboratory at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (Livermore, California) has been supplying arrayed cDNA clones to Dr.
Robert Waterston’s laboratory (the Genome Sequencing Center) at the Washington University
School of Medicine (St. Louis, Missouri) for sequencing. The sequence data are being submitted to
the Expressed Sequence Tag (EST) division of GenBank on a regular basis for immediate distri-
bution. [GenBank, built and distributed by the National Center for Biotechnology Information
(NCBI) is a central repository of publicly-available gene sequence information, widely known and
heavily used by researchers in government, academe, and industry]’’.
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advantage of nonprofit funding. If Merck paid for it as corporate R&D, it could
deduct the R&D as an expense, but would also have to justify public domain science
at stockholder expense. Through a nonprofit arm, Merck funded great science,
burnished Merck’s image, and enhanced Merck’s future freedom to operate cleanly,
without having to appropriate any returns on an ‘‘investment.’’
The SNP Consortium story started 5 years later, but followed the same general
outline, with an added level of sophistication. During the late 1990s, it became
apparent that there were many single-base-pair differences in DNA sequence among
individuals. These were dubbed Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms, or SNPs, because
of molecular biologists’ penchant for impenetrable polysyllabic neologism (IPN) and
three-letter acronyms (TLAs).
Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms could be used as DNA markers, to trace
inheritance, to look for associations with diseases or traits, and to study population
differences. They were valuable research tools. Many genomic firms, including
Celera, began to signal they were finding SNPs and filing patent applications. Given
the uncertainty about what the patent office would allow to be claimed in patents, it
seemed possible patents on SNPs would be granted, meaning anyone using patented
SNPs would need to get a license. This raised the prospect of needing to get licenses
on hundreds or even thousands of SNP sequences from some unknown (but
potentially large) number of patent owners. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit had instructed the patent office that the ‘‘nonobvious’’ criterion for DNA
sequence was met by any new DNA sequence, so ‘‘obvious’’ did not mean ‘‘obvious
how to find it’’ but ‘‘sequence determined and in hand.’’ The patent office was
signaling it might permit patents for any plausible utility, demonstrated or not, and
related to biological function or not (Doll, 1998). SNPs might be patentable. This
was just the kind of nightmare that Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg had
speculated might arise in their classic 1998 article on the ‘‘anticommons’’—situations
when too many exclusive rights upstream needed to be assembled, thus thwarting
the development of final products, such as drugs, vaccines, biologics, or instruments
(Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).
This threat awakened some companies and scientific institutions to forge an
alliance to defeat patent rights in SNPs (The SNP Consortium, 2005; Holden, 2002;
Thorisson & Stein, 2003). The SNP Consortium was founded in 1999 to first discover
SNPs, file patent applications, map and characterize the SNPs, and then finally
abandon the patent applications. The expense and paperwork of this elaborate dance
were intended to ensure SNPs landed in the public domain unfettered by patent
rights. It was deemed necessary as a defensive strategy to ensure that consortium
members would have standing as inventors should disputes arise about priority for
related inventions (in patent parlance, interference proceedings, the administrative
procedure to determine the real first inventor). Here a group of private firms of
various sizes found common cause in defeating patents on research tools. They
valued their freedom to operate highly and the threat of patenting sufficiently to pay
for a complicated, expensive procedure to enlarge the public domain.
Again, what in the world was going on? Private firms that dearly loved patents for
their own products were working together with academic institutions to defeat
patents? One interpretation might be that the public sector failed to support lines of
research with a strong need for a science commons sufficiently. But members of the
public genome project were well aware of the need for unfettered access to SNPs
and were as worried about the problem as the private firms that wanted to use SNPs
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in their research. The issue here was the presence of many different kinds of ge-
nomics firms, some of which saw an opportunity to create and sell access to SNP
research tools. It was no accident that this episode played out during the genomics
bubble years, 1998–2001, when seemingly any startup with ‘‘omics’’ in its name could
raise millions in private placements and months later (before any products hit the
market) tens of millions through Initial Public Offerings of stock. It was conceivable
that a company could raise private capital to find SNPs based on a possible paying
market to use them in research. The public sector was simply not going to be able to
mount a systematic SNP initiative fast enough and large enough to compete, and
other companies wanted to avoid having to deal with the SNP upstart firms (yes,
Celera was one of the firms with an interest in SNPs).
One interpretation of this story is that ‘‘the market,’’ some market somewhere,
solved the problem. The wonder of capitalism worked its magic by creating public
domain resources at private expense to forestall the undue private appropriation of
rents from research tools. OK, maybe so. The explanation is as complex as the
sentence that contains it. And it is clearly true that private firms funded public
domain science. Does it generalize? Can we learn to relax, and assume that excesses
of the patent system will be compensated by enlightened capitalists guarding their
long-term best interests and future freedom to operate? The Merck Gene Index and
SNP Consortium show the answer is ‘‘sometimes yes.’’ The nagging worry is that
sometimes the answer may be no.
7 The science commons and economic efficiency: costs of data access
A final historical pastiche before closing out the arguments. Consider again the
prospect of an alternative universe in which free access to data about the medical
literature and scientific data we take for granted in health research might instead be
constrained by exclusive proprietary rights. If the history and geography had been
different and database firms had turned their attention to genomics just a bit sooner,
the story might have been quite different. As it was, the early algorithms for
interpreting DNA sequence—such as the BLAST and Smith–Waterman algo-
rithms—were developed by individuals committed to open science. In more recent
years, patents have begun to issue on bioinformatic methods relevant to genomics. In
some cases, these patents confer incentives to support ‘‘products’’ marketed by firms,
with service teams and development teams to improve their quality.9 How this story
will play out remains to be seen, but the ideas of ‘‘open genomics’’ are being tested
in the real world along-side more proprietary models.
Databases themselves could become a focus of concern. The early years of the
human genome project were marked by many decisions about the disposition of
crucial databases. Human genetic disease and variation was lovingly cataloged by a
team surrounding its founder, Victor McKusick of Johns Hopkins University, in
Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man (OMIM). Many databases were established to
retain data on human genetic maps of various types, and similar databases for other
organisms. DNA sequence data were collected primarily by a trio of databases in the
United States, Europe, and Japan, and these shared data among themselves. There
9 My Duke colleague Arti Rai is working on how ideas of ‘‘open source’’ in software might be
applied (or not) to genomics. ‘‘Open source genomics’’ is the subject of her 5-year project.
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was, in effect, just one major, central DNA sequence database beginning in the early
1980s. Creating and coordinating these databases, including the sequence databases,
was its own titanic struggle (Smith, 1990), but the battle was waged with only
glancing concern for commercial potential. The databases contain many errors
(Pennissi, 1999), and creating financial incentives sufficient to encourage careful
curation and maintenance is one reason to support proprietary rights in making
databases. But that step should not be taken lightly, and now we have a decade-long
experiment in the real world to inform such decisions, with strong protection in
Europe and only copyright and contractual protections for databases in the United
States.
How different it might have been had the genome project begun in Europe, just a
decade later, when the European Community saw fit to create a new exclusive right
in databases as an incentive for companies to create and maintain valuable data. The
impacts of this new form of intellectual property have received particular attention
from the scientific community. Scientists have become concerned that rights could
hinder research. The landmark report on the topic was the Bits of Power report from
the National Research Council (1997), which has led to a line of further work. Much
of the most advanced work has focused on weather, remote imaging and other huge
and complex data sets. There may be cause for worry, and not just for scientists, but
for the innovation system as a whole. Exclusive property rights create friction and
inefficiency. It may be that free access to data generated at government and non-
profit expense is far more efficient, and a more powerful prime for the economic
engine, than allowing every incremental advance to form the basis for rent-seeking.
In the patent-happy United States that moves toward ever-longer copyright and
protects creative works with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, there is an
anomaly. Data generated at government expense and published by the government
cannot be copyrighted, and are thus freely available to anyone who wants to use
them. American government agencies are generous suppliers of data to which others
add value. It turns out that when it comes to data about the weather, it is the
Europeans who are Scrooge, charging for access. And yet US businesses that provide
weather information to various kinds of users have flourished, and the US market for
such information is vastly larger than in Europe, despite the nearly equal size of the
economies of the European Union and the United States. An analysis by Peter
Weiss of the National Weather Service concludes, ‘‘The primary reason for the
European weather risk management and commercial meteorology markets lag so far
behind the US is the restrictive data policies of a number of European national
meteorological services’’ (Weiss, 2002).
Given that genomic databases and most health research databases are publicly
administered and protect strong norms of open sharing, concern over database
protections could prove a sideshow. Perhaps it is silly to think that DNA sequence
might have been housed in a proprietary database owned by Reed Elsevier,
Springer, or Thomson. But some databases do straddle nonprofit and for-profit
worlds, and if a strong US database right were created, the rules of the game could
change. SwissProt, a database with information about proteins of interest in
molecular biology, has been the subject of dispute, both about how to fund it, and
about its pricing and access policies driven by trying to ensure its long-term financial
survival. The analogies between weather and DNA sequence data are not exact, but
careful thinking about policies bearing on health research data, including genomic
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data, is crucial, because the creation of a US database right similar to the European
counterpart remains a distinct possibility.
8 Conclusion: deliberate policies preserved a healthy science commons in genomics
The various genome projects, both public and private, pursued quite disparate
policies about sharing of data and materials. Proprietary technologies and data were
created, mainly by private startup firms, and they contributed to the pace and success
of the Human Genome Project. Deliberate policies of funding organizations, espe-
cially the Wellcome Trust and National Human Genome Research Institute and
other funders of the ‘‘public genome project’’ created and preserved a large and
important science commons of genomic data and technologies for analyzing DNA
structure and function. Agreements such as the Bermuda Rules, privately funded
initiatives such as the Merck Gene Index, and public-private hybrids such as the SNP
Consortium were deliberately designed to promote broad access to data and
materials.
Genome projects spanned a full range of openness, from rapid open access under
the Bermuda Rules, to subscription-based access to genomic data and analytical
tools at moderate cost (e.g., Celera), to highly proprietary gene-sequencing with
public disclosure mainly limited to patents as they were granted and published
(Human Genome Sciences and Incyte). The practical ‘‘public information’’ benefits
from having information widely and inexpensively available, such as public health
advances from new knowledge about health risk, reinforce the benefits for science,
where a broad network of investigators can draw on masses of information. The
value of the science commons is not an argument against the private R&D. It is,
however, a powerful argument for the need to support open science and a healthy
science commons upon which both public and private science can draw. Without
explicit policies to foster the science commons, this valuable pool of knowledge
would have been shallower, and a less productive fountain of social benefits.
Science is not just about creating knowledge, it is also about making it widely
available and making it useful. Deliberate policies to promote open access and low-
cost use enable some social benefits that profit-driven R&D cannot. Private ge-
nomics is a laudable complement to public genomics. Public genomics is, however, a
creature of deliberate policies, not just to fund the science but also to ensure that the
results are shared. It is not a system that can be left to mindless self-assembly or
politics as usual. Without an expansive science commons, many benefits would be
lost and private genomics would be vastly less productive and valuable.
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